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THE STRONGEST PRESUMPTION CHALLENGED:
SPECULATIONS ON WARREN V. RICHARD AND
SUCCESSION OF MITCHELL
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
William Marshall Shaw, Jr.**
Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled "Of Persons"' and
containing a highly ordered system for the regulation of family life, shares
with other branches of our private law the harmonious structure that is the
hallmark of a civil law system. Because of its smoothly articulated struc-
ture, the codal scheme, the product of the thought and experience of many
generations of legal scholars and administrators, is highly vulnerable to
untoward tinkering with its several parts. A change in detail may signal a
restructuring of the whole.
The Civil Code has not been revised in its entirety since 1852.2 The
spirit of the early nineteenth century, still frozen in many of the Code's
provisions, is no longer the only source of society's values. Family life, for
instance, and the moral perspectives of society have changed drastically in
the last 150 years; yet there has been little significant change in the way our
law regulates the parent-child relationship. It continues to burden illegiti-
mate children with disabilities which no longer bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the state's interest. Legislation and adjudication have brought
change piecemeal; but too often, in trying to solve a specific problem, the
legislature and the courts have had insufficient consideration for the
structure of the Civil Code as a whole.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to Mrs. Carmen Gonzalez
for her research assistance in preparing this article.
1. See generally 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 2 in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 3-4 (1966).
Since Justinian times, the private law has been characterized in civil law systems
by three principal divisions. Louisiana retains the tripartite division as evidenced by
the three books of the Civil Code-"Of Persons," "Of Things, and Of the Different
Modifications of Ownership" and "Of the Different Modes of Acquiring the Owner-
ship of Things."
2. The Reconstruction legislature which enactel the Civil Code of 1870 was
primarily motivated in its revision by a desire to eradicate the vestiges of slavery. See
Civil Code of Louisiana, Introduction xxv-xxvi (Dainow ed. 1961).
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This article focuses upon such an instance, where well-intentioned
tinkering portends a dramatic restructuring. In recent years, an increasing
impatience with the statutory treatment of illegitimate children has caused
courts to interfere with our system for regulating family life. The United
States Supreme Court has ruled in a series of cases that many of the
disabilities imposed by Louisiana law on illegitimates violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 3 Recently the Louisiana
Supreme Court has joined in the assault on the codal scheme. The court is
apparently motivated by the same concern evinced by its federal counter-
part: that illegitimate children not be deprived unreasonably of rights
accorded children generally.
However, the recent decisions of the state court have a far different
import for our law. They breach a hitherto impregnable bastion of our codal
scheme-the presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of all
children conceived during the marriage. The assault of the state court is on
two flanks: under an equal protection analysis and by statutory interpreta-
tion. Each of these attacks will be considered in this article, along with the
dangers which the authors foresee for the structure of family law.
AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
In attempting to analyze the recent cases involving the presumption of
paternity, the authors, out of convenience, have evolved a conceptual
framework with which to approach the questions raised and to which this
section introduces the reader. Two processes, interrelated but distinct, have
particular significance in this framework. The authors have attached to
them, quite arbitrarily, the labels -classificatiqn" and "filiation."
Classification
The parent-child relationship and the body of law supporting it rest
upon the fundamental dichotomy denoted by the terms "legitimate" or
"illegitimate." ,4 The class of legitimate children is limited to those who are
conceived during the marriage of their parents.5 All other children are
3. For a discussion of these cases, see text at notes 18-33, infra.
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 27: "Children are legitimate or illegitimate." The Civil
Code does not consistently embrace this dichotomy, cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 178:
"Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated." However, from a
reading of the codal scheme as a whole it is evident that this dichotomy is
fundamental.
5. LA. Civ. CODE art. 179: "Legitimate children are those who are born during
the marriage." (Emphasis added). The articles governing the action en desaveu
indicate conception, not birth, within the marriage entitles a child to legitimate status.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 184-92. Article 179 may have been mistranslated. See The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Persons, 30 LA. L. REV.
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classed as illegitimate, 6 albeit this class is further divided into numerous
sub-classes.1
171, 176 (1970): "Our present articles translate the phrase 'dans le mariage' by
'during the marriage,' whereas it should be translated 'within the marria2e.' " See
also R. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE 213-14 (2d printing 1975)
[hereinafter cited as PASCAL].
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 180: "Illegitimate children are those who are born out of
marriage.
Illegitimate children may be legitimated in certain cases, in the manner pre-
scribed by law."
7. Within the codal framework, historically, the class of illegitimate children
was further subdivided into those illegitimate children who could not be acknowl-
edged or legitimated, illegitimate children who obtained a judgment of paternity or
maternity against the biological parent (LA. CIv. CODE arts. 208-12), illegitimates who
were acknowledged by their biological parent (LA. CIV. CODE arts. 202-07), and
illegitimate children who were legitimated (LA. CIV. CODE arts. 198-201).
LA. CIv. CODE art. 181 mentions two sorts of illegitimates: "Those who are born
from two persons, who, at the moment when such children were conceived might
have legally contracted marriage with each other; and those who are born from
persons to whose marriage there existed at the time some legal impediment." Into the
latter category fall (1) adulterous bastards, "those produced by an unlawful connec-
tion between two persons, who at the time when the child was conceived, were, either
of them or both, connected by marriage with some other person," (LA. CIv. CODE
art. 182) and (2) incestuous bastards, "those who are produced by the illegal
connection of two persons who are relations within the degrees prohibited by law."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 183. Adulterous and incestuous bastards, generally speaking,
cannot be acknowledged or legitimated. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 198, 200, and 204.
However, there are exceptions. In the case of adulterous bastards, if there is a
subsequent legal marriage of the biological parents, after the impediment to the
marriage is removed, the child may be acknowledged. LA. CIv. CODE art. 204. If he is
so acknowledged, he is automatically legitimated. LA. Civ. CODE art. 198. Further-
more, once the impediment to the marriage is removed, a biological parent can in
some instances legitimate the child by notarial act, (LA. Civ. CODE art. 200) which
necessarily includes the right to acknowledge the child by act. LA. CIV. CODE art. 203.
See Goins v. Gates, 229 La. 740, 93 So. 2d 307 (La. App. I st Cir. 1957). The latter right
exists regardless of whether the biological parents contract a legal marriage. As to
incestuous bastards, by virtue of the 1972 and 1974 legislative amendments to LA.
CIv. CODE art. 95, certain children born during the existence of a marriage contracted
between persons related within the prohibited degrees prior to 1974 are now to be
considered legitimate. (The amendment in 1972, and again in 1974, ratified all
marriages contracted in contravention of LA. CIV. CODE art. 95). But, note the
specific prohibition contained in LA. CIV. CODE art. 198, prohibiting legitimation of
incestuous bastards by subsequent marriage of the natural parents.
Despite the provisions prohibiting in certain instances the acknowledgment
and/or legitimation of adulterous and incestuous bastards, there is no such specific
prohibition contained in the articles regulating proof of paternity. See In reTyson, 306
So. 2d 822 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). An illegitimate, under LA. CIv. CODE art. 208 who
has "not been legally acknowledged, may be allowed to prove" his paternal descent
by proof as outlined in LA. CIv. CODE arts. 209-10. Upon establishing paternal
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For purposes of this article, "classification" is defined as the process
of arranging persons in, or assigning persons to, either the class of
legitimate children or the class of illegitimate children. The related concept
of "status" is correspondingly defined as the legal standing of a person as
determined by his membership in one of these two classes.
The purpose of classification is to provide a vehicle for regulation of
the parent-child relationship, that is, for identifying the rights and obliga-
tions which parents incur by the birth of their children. It has as its object the
"what" of parental rights and obligations. The classes themselves have no
intrinsic importance. Their significance arises when the legislator assigns
meaning to status by conditioning the exercise of specific rights and powers
upon membership in one of the classes.8 It may be said, then, that the
importance of classification derives from its effects, that is, the legal
consequences which the legislator chooses to attach to status. Without those
consequences, classification is a futile exercise, and status an empty
distinction. In Louisiana, the effects of classification reach throughout the
private law, conditioning parental rights and obligations upon their chil-
dren's status. 9 Legitimate relations are bound in a tighter web of legally
descent, the illegitimate becomes entitled to claim financial support in the form of
alimony. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 240-45.
An illegitimate child who is acknowledged by his natural parent enjoys not only
the right to claim alimony from the parent so acknolwedging (LA. CIv. CODE art. 242),
but also the restricted right of intestate inheritance. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 918-19.
Under the codal scheme an illegitimate could only be acknowledged by one of two
methods: (I) notarial act or (2) registering of the birth or baptism of such child. LA.
CIv. CODE art. 203. However, the court in Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635
(1921), recognized an alternate method of acknowledgment, hereinafter referred to
as informal acknowledgment. Proof of informal acknowledgment consisted essen-
tially of the same proof required for paternal descent under LA. Civ. CODE art. 209.
See also Minor v. Young, 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921); PASCAL at 262-63. Informal
acknowledgment was legislatively recognized in a 1944 amendment to Article 198.
Historically, the effect of legitimation upon the illegitimate's status was to
accord to that child the same rights as a legitimate child (LA. Civ. CODE art. 199), to
date from the last act required for legitimation. PASCAL at 263. See also I M. Planiol,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. I, no. 1567 at 869 (11 th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959); LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 198, 200. For comparative treatment of similar statutory and other
schemes, see "Bastards," 10 AM. JUR. 2d 837 et seq.
8. An example of a classification which had no consequences was LA. CIv.
CODE art. 36: "Males who have not attained the age of fourteen years complete, and
females who are under twelve, are under the age of puberty; and males who have
attained fourteen years complete, and females the age of twelve complete, are
distinguished by the name of adults." For an interpretation of article 36 which would
have salvaged its significance, see PASCAL at 49. This article was repealed by the
Legislature in 1974.
9. For a comprehensive outline of the effect of classification on Louisiana
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imposed mutual rights and obligations than are illegitimate relations.
Classification is made according to a three-step method prescribed by
the Civil Code: (1) identify the mother, (2) identify the father, (3)
determine date of conception.10 If the date of conception falls within the
marriage of the father and mother, then the child is legitimate; if not, the
child is illegitimate.
Filiation
"Filiation," for purposes of this article, is defined as the act of fixing
paternity, that is, of identifying a specific man as the biological father of a
specific child.
That the fact of paternity is essentially unprovable has had important
consequences for the law of persons. It serves no purpose to establish
parental obligations unless they are enforceable against identifiable per-
succession and other related laws, with respect to the illegitimate, see Pascal,
Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Prompted by
Labine v. Vincent, 46 TUL. L. REV. 167 (1971), and for a historical discussion of the
corresponding French provisions, see I M. Planiol, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, nos.
658-66 (1 1th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) and 3 M. Planiol, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
pt. 1, nos. 1780-1849 (1 1th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
In summary, Professor Pascal writes: "[L]egitimate descendants always
exclude illegitimate descendants in intestate succession. (LA. CIV. CODE arts. 902,
915, 918-19). Legitimate descendants and fathers and mothers are forced heirs, but
their illegitimate counterparts are not. (LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1493-95). Legitimate
ascendants and descendants in need may claim alimony from each other regardless of
their abilities to provide for themselves if they would (LA. Civ. CODE art. 229);
illegitimates may claim alimony only if not able to provide for themselves. (LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 240-45). . . On the other hand, illegitimates cannot be said to be without
substantial rights. From their mother who has acknowledged them. . ., illegitimate
children inherit her entire patrimony to the exclusion of her surviving spouse and of
all relatives other than her legitimate descendants. (LA. CIV. CODE art. 918). From
their father who has acknowledged them they inherit only in the absence of even
remote legitimate relatives and a surviving spouse (LA. CIv. CODE art. 919); but he
may donate to them up to one-fourth of his patrimony (and sometimes one-third) if he
leaves legitimate relations, and all of it if he leaves none. (LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1486-87). All illegitimates who either have been acknowledged or, being acknowl-
edgeable but not acknowledged, cf. In re Tyson, 306 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1975), prove who their parents are may demand alimony from them. (LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 240-45). And, even the unacknowledgeable illegitimate may prove who his
mother is, unless she is a married woman (LA. CIv. CODE art. 212), and may claim
alimony from her. (LA. CIv. CODE art. 245)." Id. at 174.
10. See generally LA. CIv. CODE arts. 184-92; PASCAL at 212-59.
11. Note that in Book I, Title VII, Chapter 2, Section 2 ("Of the Manner of
Proving Legitimate Filiation," LA. CIV. CODE arts. 193-97), the word "filiation"
means the fact of parentage-either paternity or maternity. However, for purposes
of this article, the authors define the word "filiation" in a more restricted manner.
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sons, but the identity of the father is almost always within the sole
knowledge of the mother-if of anyone-and verifying her testimony
affirmatively is impossible.
Consequently, filiation's main concern is with proof: what sort of
evidence is required to prove the identity of the father to the satisfaction of
the trier of fact. Faced with insuperable problems of proof, the law has
created a mechanism for legitimate filiation which avoids clumsy case-by-
case adjudication. Themost important cog in this mechanism is Civil Code
Article 184, which establishes "the strongest presumption in the law":
The law considers the husband of the mother as the father of all
children conceived during the marriage.
Identification of the mother is comparatively easy. If the date of conception
can be shown to fall within an existing marriage between the mother and her
husband, then her husband is presumed to be the father, and the necessity of
proving paternity affirmatively is obviated. Proof of the date of conception
being inexact, the law also establishes, within liberal bounds, the days in
which conception is presumed to have occurred, counting back from the
date of birth and with reference to the existence of the marriage.I2
The presumption established in Article 184 was not intended to be
irrebuttable. Strict judicial interpretation of the causes of an action en
desaveul3 and severe limitations on the right to bring it' 4 have rendered the
12. LA. Civ. CODE art. 186: "The child capable of living, which is born before
the one hundred and eightieth day after the marriage, is not presumed to be the child
of the husband; every child born alive more than six months after conception, is
presumed to be capable of living."
LA. Civ. CODE art. 187: "The same rule applies with respect to the child born
three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage, or after the sentence of
separation from bed and board."
Most recently, in McConkey v. Pinto, 305 So. 2d 469 (La. 1974), the Louisiana
Supreme Court refused to consider evidence in the form of expert medical testimony
of the actual date of conception controlling when the child was born more than one
hundred eighty days after the marriage. LA. CIv. CODE art. 186. Note that the new
legislation (La. Acts 1976, No. 430; see note 64, infra) contains no provision
establishing proof of conception where it occurs prior to the marriage.
13. See, e.g., Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So. 2d
328 (1972); Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So. 2d 619 (1972); Williams v.
Williams, 230 La. 1,87 So. 2d 707 (1956). See also Feltus v. Feltus, 2 10 So. 2d 388 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 146 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Singley v. Singley, 140 So. 2d 546 (La. App. I st Cir. 1962), for examples of instances
in which the husband was successful in disavowing a child born to his wife.
The following are representative of the scholarly commentaries which treat the
"strongest presumption in the law": Pascal, Who Is the Papa? 18 LA. L. REV. 685
(1958); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
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presumption practically irrebuttable. Application of the presumption occa-
sionally produces absurd results, but its inviolability has been favored as a
protection to children individually and to the family as a unit. 15
Filiation can be described as a "relational" process, in that it has as its
purpose the identification of a father-child relationship existing between
two specific persons. It relates a specific child to a specific father. Its object
is the "who" of paternal rights and obligations. As has been noted above,
however, identification of the father is also one step in the codal method for
classification of children. Because paternity plays a role in determining the
"what" of paternal obligations, filiation, which fixes paternity, is prece-
dent to and has an effect on classification. In this article, the authors will
refer to either filiation's "relational" function or its "classificatory"
Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 261-63 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1955-1956 Term-Persons, 17 LA. L. REV. 310-11 (1957); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Persons, 14 LA. L. REV. 121-26
(1953); Comment, The Uniform Act on Blood Tests: Disavowal and Divorce, 33 LA.
L. REV. 646 (1973); Comment, Action en Desaveu-Challenging the Presumption of
the Husband's Paternity, 23 LA. L. REV. 759 (1963); Comment, Presumption of
Legitimacy and the "Action en Desaveu" (Part I), 13 LA. L. REV. 587 (1953) and
Comment, Presumption of Legitimacy and the "Action en Desaveu " (Part II), 14 LA.
L. REV. 401 (1954); Note, 17 LA. L. REV. 494-98 (1957). See generally PASCAL at
212-59.
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 191: "In all the cases above enumerated, where the
presumption of paternity ceases, the husband of the mother, if he intends to dispute
the legitimacy of the child, must do it within six months from the birth of the child, if
he be in the parish where the child is born, or within six months after his return, if he
be absent at that time, or within six months after the discovery of the fraud, if the
birth of the child was concealed from him; or he shall be barred from making any
objection to the legitimacy of such child."
LA. CIV. CODE art. 192: "If the husband dies without having made such
objection, but before the expiration of the time directed by law, six months shall be
granted to his heirs to contest the legitimacy of the child, to be counted from the time
when the child has taken possession of the estate of the husband, or when the heirs
shall have been disturbed by the child, in their possession thereof."
15. In Succession of Saloy, 44 La. 433, 443, 10 So. 872, 872-76 (1892), Justice
Bermudez opined, "When, aware of the circumstances under which he might have
exercised the right of repudiation, the husband, who is the sovereign arbiter of his
honor, fails to do so, the door is forever closed and no one can afterwards assert a
right strictly personal to him. Permitting such a thing would be to strike a heavy blow
at the sacredness of family ties, keep the honor of the wife and of the children in a
condition of constant trepidation, and allow the foundation of society to be at all
times, exposed to tottering and upturning. . . . The sanctity With which the law
surrounds marital relations and the reputation and good fame of the spouses and of
the children born during their marriage is of such inviolability that the mother and the
children can never brand themselves with declarations of adultery, illegitimacy and
bastardy, and their character is not permitted lightly to be thus aspersed, however
true in themselves the stern and odious facts may unfortunately be."
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function by way of distinguishing between the different roles that filiation
plays in the regulation of the father-child relationship.
Filiation and classification both refer in the first instance to the
existence of a marriage between the parents. The marriage contract in our
monogamous society confers upon the husband the right to exclusive sexual
access to the wife and therefore provides a basis for the presumption of
article 184.16 By contrast, filiation outside of marriage depends primarily
upon the reputed father's voluntary admission, either express or tacit, of
paternity. ' 7 A valid reason for distinguishing between children on the basis
16. "The concept of legitimacy developed early as a refinement of the blood tie
to distinguish the offspring of stable, permanent relationships (with certain paternity)
from the product of casual, impermanent liaisons (with uncertain paternity)." H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1971).
"In a society so constituted monogamy won favor owing to the certainty of the
blood relationship amongst issue of the union. The wife is singled out from other
women by being appropriated to one man, and, when she becomes a mother, the
presumptive paternity of the husband, though never so conclusive as the maternity,
has a strength about it that no other form of marriage can give. The demarcation
between legitimate and illegitimate offspring arose in Europe primarily from the
certainty of parentage established by the monogamous union and latterly from the
sanctity bestowed on such unions by the Catholic Church. W. HOOPER, THE
LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 2 (1911).
"In almost every culture the family is a basic institution honored in the mores
and desired by individuals. Paul said [I. Corin. 7:7] 'To avoid fornication, let every
man have his own wife and let every woman have her own husband.' "S. QUEEN & J.
ADAMS, THE FAMILY IN VARIOUS CULTURES 151 (1952).
As recently as 1974, in Creech v. Capital Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 513-14
(La. 1974), Justice Summers in a dissenting opinion stated, "The life, happiness,
prosperity and stability of the family are a matter of constant concern throughout our
Code. They are concerns which are the outgrowth of natural law, equity and folksy
common sense. No system is fundamentally sound or likely to survive which tends to
dissolve the family as a unit. History reveals that no society has attained and
maintained a high state of civilization unless the family unit was the basis of its
structure."
17. See note 7, supra. The difference between express and tacit admissions of
paternity lies in voluntary express admissions by the alleged father of his paternity-
i.e., legitimation by subsequent marriage and formal or informal acknowledgment,
legitimation by notarial act, "formal" acknowledgment by act (LA. CIv. CODE art.
203) or registering the birth or baptism, "informal" acknowledgment essentially by
the same proof required to prove paternal descent (LA. Clv. CODE arts. 209 (1), 209
(2)) and circumstances indicating that a particular person is the father. In the latter
category, examples of such circumstances would be (1) when the mother was known
as living in a state of concubinage with the father, and resided as such in his house at
the time when the child was conceived (LA. CIv. CODE art. 209 (3)), and (2) the oath of
the mother, supported by proof of the cohabitation of the reputed father with her, out
of his house if the mother is not a woman of dissolute manners or has not had an
unlawful connection with one or more men either before or since the birth of the
child. LA. Clv. CODE art. 210.
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of status is the greater confidence the law has in filiation within marriage.
The possibility of fraud or error in fixing paternity is diminished by moral
constraints and the husband's vigilance. In order to protect children from the
stigma of illegitimacy, however, Louisiana courts have frequently related
two persons in the father-child bond who could not possibly have a
biological connection. The concern of the courts to abate the effects of
classification has been indulged to the neglect of the relational function of
filiation.
WARREN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions commencing
in 1968, ruled unconstitutional provisions of state and federal laws which
had the effect of denying to illegitimate children certain rights enjoyed by
legitimate children. In Levy v. Louisiana18 and Glona v. American Guaran-
tee and Liability Ins. Co., 19 the Court declared unconstitutional judicial
interpretations 20 of Civil Code article 2315, the Louisiana wrongful death
18. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levyfive unacknowledged illegitimate children sought
recovery for the wrongful death of their mother under LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. The
rationale of the majority of the Court was that since the illegitimacy of the children's
birth bore no rational relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted upon their
mother, and since it was invidious to discriminate against the children when no action
or conduct of theirs was possibly relevant to the harm that was done their mother, the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated by denying them
the right to maintain an action for their mother's wrongful death. For a discussion of
the impact of Levy on Louisiana law, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1968-1969 Term-Persons, 30 LA. L. REV. 171, 171-178 (1970).
19. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). In Glona a mother was suing to recover for the wrongful
death of her illegitimate son. In distinguishing factually Glona from Levy, the United
States Supreme Court nonetheless held that to deny the mother of an illegitimate the
right to recover for his wrongful death under LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315 would be a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. According to
the majority of the Court, there is no rational basis "for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause
of illegitimacy will be served." Id. at 75.
20. Levy and Glona, described as "constitutional curiosities" by Justice Harlan
in his dissent (for a discussion of these cases, see notes 18 and 19, supra), bewilder the
authors. By long-standing judicial interpretation of the wrongful death statute, the
cause of action lay only with legitimate (or certain illegitimate) relations. (See note 21,
infra.) If this interpretation is the only possible one to give the statute in light of the
legislative intent, then the entire statute is unconstitutional, and all relations, legiti-
mate or illegitimate, are left without a remedy. State courts are the proper tribunals to
interpret state law. The authors believe that the Supreme Court, rather than revers-
ing, should have remanded Levy to allow the state court to re-interpret the statute in
light of its opinion. The federal district court in which Glona was brought would be
bound under the Erie doctrine by the state court interpretation. The tendency of the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statute,2 which denied to certain illegitimate relations the benefits of that
act. Similarly, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,22 it held
unconstitutional that provision which relegated dependent, unacknowl-
edged illegitimate children to a lower order of priority for benefits under the
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute. 23 In cases arising under the
laws of other states24 and under federal statutes,2 5 the United States Supreme
Court to treat state courts as stepchildren of the federal system, particularly in equal
protection cases, may have been a contributing factor to the results in Warren and
Mitchell, where constitutional issues were handled in such a manner as to avoid
review by the United States Supreme Court.
21. For a history of the decisions interpreting this provision, see Johnson, Death
on the Callais Coach: The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival
Actions, 37 LA. L. REV. 1 (1976).
22. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In Weber the United States Supreme Court held that
Louisiana's workmen's compensation law which denied the right of dependent
unacknowledged illegitimate children to recover benefits for the death of their
natural father on an equal footing with dependent legitimate children violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
23. LA. R.S. 23:1021(3) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 583, defines
children as "only legitimate children, step-children, posthumous children, adopted
children, and illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil Code
Articles 203, 204, and 205." LA. R.S. 23:1232 (1950) establishes the priority of
payment of workmen's compensation benefits to the various classifications of
dependents, and by virtue of Section 1021(3) and its definition of children, unac-
knowledged illegitimates were relegated to eighth position as "other dependents."
LA. R.S. 23:1232 (8) (1950).
24. New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill, the question involved the constitutionality of the New Jersey "Assistance to
Families of the Working Poor" legislation (N.J. STAT. 44:13-1 et seq.). Under New
Jersey's statutory scheme, limited benefits to qualified families "which consist of a
household composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremonially married to each
other who have at least one minor child. . . of both, the natural child of one and
adopted by the other, or a child adopted by both .... "N.J. STAT. 44:13-3 (a). The
appellants argued that the "practical effect" of the statute was to deny benefits to
illegitimate children while granting such benefits to legitimate children. In a per
curiam opinion the United States Supreme Court sustained the arguments of the
appellants that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment-'"for there can be no doubt that the benefits extended under the
challenged program are as indispensable to the health and well-being of illegitimate
children as to those who are legitimate." Id. at 621. In its opinion the Court cited
Weber, (see note 22, supra), Levy, (see note 18, supra), and Gomez v. Perez, (see note
29, infra), as compelling the conclusion in the instant case. See also Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972), in which an Illinois statute, declaring children of unmarried
fathers upon the death of the mother, dependents, or wards of the state without any
hearing on parental fitness, was held unconstitutional as a denial of due process and
equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
25. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) and Mathews v. Lucas, 44
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Court has continued to expand the rights of illegitimates to approximate
those enjoyed by legitimate children, and thus narrow the gap resulting from
difference in status.
Against this background, the Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted
in Warren v. Richard26 with a case involving rival claimants under the
U.S.L.W. 5139 (June 29, 1976) involved the question of constitutionality of provi-
sions of the Social Security Act under the due process clauseof the fifth amendment.
In Jimenez v. Weinberger, the appellants, a father and his two non-legitimated
illegitimate children born after the onset of his disability, sought benefits from the
father's disability insurance denied to the children under 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3)(A),
416(h)(2)(A), (B), 416(h)(3)(B). The effect of the cited provisions of the Social
Security Act is that illegitimate children born after the onset of the parent's disability
cannot obtain benefits unless they are eligible under the provisions regarding
legitimation, inheritance or defective marriage ceremonies. The United States
Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Social Security Act in question were
"a denial of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment" in that afterborn illegitimate children are divided into two
subclassifications: (1) those illegitimate children entitled to benefits (a) who can
inherit under state intestacy laws or (b) who are legitimated under state law, or (c)
who are illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents' ceremonial
marriage and (2) those illegitimate children conclusively denied benefits because they
do not fall within one of the foregoing categories. Although the Court recognized that
"the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate governmental interest .. t. ilt
does not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants'
subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims."
Id. at 636.
Again, in Mathews v. Lucas, the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge
to provisions of the Social Security Act which denied appellees insurance benefits for
failure to prove that the deceased wage earner was, at the time of his death, living
with the child or contributing to his support. The appellees argued that certain
children were relieved of the burden of "such individualized proof of dependency"
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2)(A), (B), 416(h)(3), and thus "statutorily
entitled, as the Lucas children [appellees] are not, to survivorship benefits regardless
of actual dependency." 44 U. S. L.W. at 5140-41. The Court concluded, however, that
the challenged provisions were constitutional in that the statutory classifications
were "reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death." Id. at 5143.
Further, "[sluch presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication
would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of
precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the
applicable level of scrutiny." Id. In distinguishing Jimenez v. Weinberger, supra,
Justice Blackmun stated, "this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of
afterborn illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on
dependency in Jimenez, is absent here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible
child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing contribution to support, or
cohabitation, at the time of death." Id. at 5144.
26. 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974).
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wrongful death statute.27 The decedent was (1) the legitimate son of plaintiff
and (2) the biological father of a child whose mother was married to another
man, the husband, at the time that the child was conceived and born.
Defendant tortfeasor raised an exception of no right or cause of action to
plaintiff's suit, and moved for summary judgment, alleging a court-
approved compromise and settlement with the child, whose claim under
article 2315 preempted that of plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that the child
could not recover for decedent's death, since the child was conclusively
presumed to be the legitimate issue of the husband of its mother under Civil
Code article 184.28 Affirming the lower courts, the supreme court held that a
child is entitled to recover for wrongful death of its biological father, to the
exclusion of decedent's legitimate ascendant, even though the child is
conclusively presumed under state law to be issue of another man.
In reaching its decision in Warren, the court relied solely upon the
constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme Court in those
cases involving the denial of rights to illegitimates because of their status.
The court placed specific emphasis upon Levy, Glona, Weber, and Gomez
v. Perez,29 and declared:
As we understand the rationale of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, it is the biological relationship and dependency which
is determinative of the child's rights in these cases, and not the
classification into which the child is placed by the statutory law of the
state.3 0
The court was therefore "compelled" to hold as it did, for an adverse
holding "would ignore the existence of the child's biological father."'"
It is not out of place to inquire whether the court in Warren properly
understood the rationale of the federal decisions. Those cited in Warren
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 184: "The law considers the husband of the mother as
the father of all children conceived during the marriage."
29. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In Gomez the mother of an illegitimate child sought
financial support for the child from the natural father; however, under Texas law a
natural father had no legal obligation to support his illegitimate child. In a per curiam
opinion the United States Supreme Court held that the statutory denial of support to
an illegitimate child from the child's natural father violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment: "We therefore hold that once a State posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural
fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother."
Id. at 538.
30. 296 So. 2d 813, 817 (La. 1974).
31. Id.
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were grounded upon a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment, and it is on such a basis that Warren rests.32 "Equal
protection" is more than a mere shibboleth; the term denotes a way of
approaching and analyzing a case. In setting up an equal protection claim, a
party shows the existence of two discrete classes of persons, membership in
one of which entitles a person by law to rights denied members of the other
class. The court examines the effect of the unequal treatment to determine
whether the discrimination has a "rational basis" or whether it is "invidi-
ous. 33 In short, an equal protection analysis presupposes classification and
focuses upon the effects of classification.
The cases cited in Warren follow this pattern. Each case involved
children who were classified as illegitimate. In each, parental descent was
shown by proof sufficient under the requirements of state law, and classifi-
cation was made in conformance with state law. In each, a child or a parent
was denied a right accorded children or parents generally solely on the basis
of status. In each, the question before the Supreme Court involved the effect
of classification. In each, the deprivation on account of status bore no
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and thus was held
unconstitutional.
Contrast the federal cases with the situation in Warren. The child in
Warren enjoyed legitimate status. She was deprived of no rights on the
basis of status. The effects of classification were not at issue. The plight of
illegitimate children, as a class, was not ameliorated by this decision. At
issue in Warren was the process of filiation imposed upon the child by state
law. Under prior jurisprudence she was not entitled to recover for the
wrongful death of decedent because, in the eyes of the law, he was not her
father. The fixing of paternity precedes classification, and it was at this
point that plaintiff objected. The state process of filiation might "ignore the
32. Id. at 816-17.
33. The test of equal protection has been formulated variously. In all of its
written incarnations, it is imprecise and difficult to apply. See e.g., Mathews v.
Lucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5139, 5141 (June 29, 1976): "Statutory classifications, of
course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the character of the
discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims. 'The essential inquiry
S. .is... .inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?' Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972)." In formulat-
ing the test of equal protection applicable to statutes discriminating between individu-
als on the basis of their legitimacy, the court held that it was not a suspect
classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny traditional in cases involving discrimi-
nation on the basis of race. Id. at 5142.
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existence of the child's biological father," but that is because it was
engineered to do so.
It is submitted that Levy and Glona did not "substitute a biological
classification for the legal classification Louisiana had long observed," 34 if,
by that phrase, the Louisiana Supreme Court means that they changed our
process of filiation. All the cited cases are clearly distinguishable, and
indeed there is evidence that the United States Supreme Court purposely
evaded the problem of fixing paternity.35 In the authors' opinion, the court
in Warren erred by assimilating problems of filiation to problems of
classification, whereas they should be approached in different ways. Part of
the confusion arises because filiation does have a classificatory function,
but it was the relational, not the classificatory, function which was "at
fault" in Warren. Some confusion also arises, it is suspected, because of
the traditional tendency of the courts to view the presumption of paternity as
a mere device to save innocent children from the opprobrium of illegiti-
macy, to the disregard of its relational function. 36
Warren raises problems in application. It destroys the conclusiveness
of Article 184 in all cases arising under Levy and progeny, yet provides no
substitute standards by which paternity may be proven. It is not even clear
that it is restricted to those cases in which it can be shown that the husband
34. 296 So. 2d 813, 816 (La. 1974).
35. One purpose of Article 184 is to preclude fraudulent or erroneous claims of
paternity, which is a notoriously difficult fact to prove affirmatively. In the cases
cited, the Court emphasized that its decisions would not have the effect of changing
the burden of proof which the state requires to show the true facts of parentage.
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,552,
(1971), in which he found unconstitutional Louisiana's laws discriminating against
illegitimates with respect to successions law, nonetheless stated that "Louisiana
might be thought to have an interest in requiring people to go through certain
formalities in order to eliminate complicated questions of proof and the opportunity
for both error and fraud in determining paternity after the death of the father." In
Weber v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), the Court stated,". . the
state interest in minimizing problems of proof, is not significantly disturbed by our
decision." In tlie per curiam opinion in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973), the
Court recognized " . . . the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity.
Those problems are not to be lightly brushed aside. Justice Douglas, in
speaking for the majority of the Court in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968), wrote, "Opening the courts to suits of this kind may
conceivably be a temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently. That
problem, however, concerns burden of proof."
36. See, e.g., a discussion of children born of null marriages in PASCAL at 219,
wherein the author concludes: "A more obvious attempt to give preference to
legitimate status over truth regarding actual paternity, to the complete disregard of
justice to the husband of the mother, could not be found."
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could not possibly be the father. If anyone who believes that he has a
biological relationship to a decedent has a constitutional right to make out
the true facts of paternity, by any evidence and regardless of a contrary
presumption, 37 then every wrongful death action bears the seeds of a suit to
fix paternity. Moreover, the father-child relationship so fixed will appar-
ently bear the consequences normally associated therewith only for those
limited purposes defined by the United States Supreme Court. The result is
part-time paternity. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has
upheld, provisionally at least, Louisiana's succession laws discriminating
against illegitimates. 38 There is under the Louisiana Supreme Court's
reasoning no constitutional compulsion to "substitute the biological clas-
sification" in cases arising under succession law. Thus, with regard to
inheritance, the decedent's child is a stranger to his succession, although the
child may recover for his wrongful death.
37. The procedural posture of Warren is interesting. Both lower courts had
dismissed plaintiff's action on an exception of no right or cause of action and an
alternative motion for a summary judgment filed by defendant. See Warren v.
Richard, 283 So. 2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). The supreme court granted
certiorari and reviewed a record which contained by way of relevant evidence (1) a
birth certificate and prior tutorship proceedings on behalf of the child, both of which
indicated that the child was the biological issue of decedent, and (2) affidavits alleging
that the child's mother was married to a man other than the decedent at the time the
child was born. Submission of affidavits would indicate that the procedural vehicle
used was the motion for summary judgment. If so, the supreme court implicitly found
that there vas no genuine issue of material fact. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 967. It must
be inferredtherefrom that the fact of marriage establishing the presumption of Article
184 is of no probative value in determining "biological" as opposed to "legal"
paternity. If such is the case, it is common sense to suppose that motives of judicial
economy overcame procedural niceties and that, in the proper instance, such
evidence would be given probative effect for determining "biological" facts.
38. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). But see, Succession of Fuselier, 325
So. 2d 296, 301-02, n.5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). "I believe that Article 83 of the
Louisiana Civil Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of
the United States. Notwithstanding the 5 to 4 vote of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Labine v. Vincent, . . . I believe the facts of this case would have
provoked a totally different result . . . . These observations do not detract in any
way from my admiration of those gifted French lawyers, judges and legal scholars
who were the redactors of our Code. They were worldly and worldly-wise during
their moment in history and their codification of the law in such critically important
and complicated areas as legitimacy and succession rights has, in many important
ways, withstood the relentless and inexorable tests of time. Yet, I believe that our
Civil Code must be interpreted in the bright reflected light of the Constitution and I
believe that the constitutional safeguard of equal protection connotes an ever
changing, always vibrant quest for fairness and impartiality in the administration of
justice." (Beer, J.).
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The authors disagree with the holding in Warren, but that is not to say
that the result is wrong. As has been observed elsewhere, 39 the presumption
of article 184, being essentially irrebuttable, may offend notions of due
process where its application does not promote justice for all interested
parties. 40 However, the due process analysis presupposes a distinction
between filiation and classification, a distinction which the court in Warren
failed to make.
MITCHELL: THE STATUTORY ATrACK
Legitimation is the process by which a child, classified as illegitimate,
achieves legitimate status. 4' Legitimated children enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children from the date of legitimation. 42 Civil Code article 198
provides for one method of legitimation:
Children born out of marriage, except those who are born from an
incestuous connection, are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
their father and mother, whenever the latter have formally or infor-
mally acknowledged them for their children, either before or after the
marriage.
As is clear from the legislative history of article 198, legitimation has won
increasing favor as a device for the protection of children. 43
39. PASCAL at 21619.
40. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) and Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,638 (1974).
41. See note 7, supra.
42. LA. CIv. CODE art. 199: "Children legitimated by a subsequent marriage
have the same rights as if they were born during marriage." See also discussion in
note 7, supra.
43. In Succession of Mitchell, Justice Tate relies heavily upon the legislative
history of LA. Civ. CODE art. 198 as a basis for his decision that an adulterous child
presumed the legitimate child of the husband of the mother under LA. CIv. CODE art.
184 can nonetheless be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the natural parents.
"As originally enacted by the Civil Code of 1808, it provided (almost verbatim to
French Civil Code Article 331) that children born out of marriage, 'except those who
are born from an incestuous or adulterous connection,' 'may be' legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of their parents, 'whenever the latter have legally acknowledged
them for their children, either before their marriage or by their contract of marriage
itself.' La. Digest of 1808, chp. Il, sec. I, art. 21 . . . .The article, as re-enacted in
the Code of 1825 (Art. 217) and the Code of 1870 (Art. 198), was amended by Act 50 of
1944. This amendment made legitimation by the subsequent marriage automatic ('are
legitimated') by the acknowledgment at any time, either before or after the marriage,
'whenever the [parents] have formally [as before] or informally [new] acknowledged
them for their children.' Pertinently, the article was further amended by Act 482 of
1948 to remove expressly the bar to legitimation of children born of an adulterous
connection. Thus, the legislative history of amendment to the code article indicates
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In Succession of Mitchell,44 the Louisiana Supreme Court used an
interpretation of article 198 to obtain a just result. Plaintiffs therein claimed
an interest in a succession by representation of their biological father. 45 At
the dates of their birth, however, their mother was married to another man;
only subsequent to their births did she obtain a divorce from her first
husband and marry the plaintiffs' biological father. The court accepted as
proven plaintiffs' allegations of biological descent. Reversing the lower
courts, 46 the supreme court held, that under article 198, children are
an express legislative intent to permit the legitimation of adulterous children by the
subsequent marriage of their parents. This 1948 amendment was the latest of a series
of legislative amendments favoring automatic legitimation by the subsequent mar-
riage of their parents of children born outside of a marriage between them but
admitted to be their biological children." 323 So. 2d at 454-55.
44. 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975).
45. The succession in which the children in Mitchell sought to inherit was that of
their biological father's sister. She had died without leaving ascendants or descen-
dants; thus, her brothers and sisters and their descendants were her legal heirs by
virtue of LA. CIv. CODE art. 912. The biological children of her predeceased brother
claimed a share of the estate by representation. LA. CIv. CODE art. 897: "In the
collateral line, representation is admitted in favor of the children and descendants of
the brothers and sisters of the deceased, whether they come to the succession in
concurrence with the uncles and aunts, or whether, the brothers and sisters of the
deceased having died, the succession devolves on their descendants in equal or
unequal degrees." See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 898.
46. The lower courts, district and appellate, rejected the claim of the children
that they were legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents; and they "did
so in reliance upon George v. Bertrand, 217 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 253 La. 647, 219 So. 2d 177 (La. 1969) and Succession of Barlow, 197 So. 2d
682 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 917, 199 So. 2d 921 (1967)." 323 So. 2d at
452. The Louisiana Supreme Court expressly granted certiorari in Succession of
Mitchell "to consider the correctness of the cited intermediate decisions in George
and Barlow...." Id.
In Succession of Barlow, one of the parties to a contest for the property of the
deceased based her claim as legal heir upon the marriage of her mother and the
deceased subsequent to her birth. Isabelle Barlow Nettles alleged that she was the
legitimated child of the deceased, even though she was born during the marriage of
her mother to Nathan Lestrick. Conceding that the presumption of LA. CIV. CODE
art. 184 applied, counsel for Mrs. Nettles argued that she was also the legitimated
child of the deceased by virtue of LA. CIv. CODE art. 198 (legitimation by subsequent
marriage of the natural parents). In rejecting the argument of counsel, the court
examined the 1948 amendment to Article 198 which deleted the prohibition against
legitimation of a child born of an adulterous union. However, the court reasoned that
Mrs. Nettles could not be legitimated under Article 198 because she was not
illegitimate and, in the words of that article, not "born out of marriage." Further-
more, the court added, "If the argument were valid, what of her relationship in such a
situation to her mother? Would she be both legitimate and legitimated? We think this
would be a conflict of status not sanctioned by LSA-C.C. art. 178, which provides:
'Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated.' Note the 'either or'
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legitimated with respect to their biological father even if they are presumed
under article 184 to be the legitimate children of another man.
The court framed the issues in terms of status. 47 Is a "technically" 48
possibilities only." 197 So. 2d 682, 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
In George v. Bertrand the alleged father brought a suit for the wrongful death of
his son under LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. The basis of the alleged father's claim was that
the child was his biological son who was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
him and the mother. (LA. CIv. CODE art. 198). However, the evidence showed that
the child was conceived during the marriage of the mother to her legal husband, Willie
Jackson, and thus the presumption of LA. CIv. CODE art. 184 applied. The court
determined that since no action to disavow the paternity had been brought by Willie
Jackson, "there is no reason that the presumption should not apply." 217 So. 2d 47,
48 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). In citing Succession of Barlow, supra, the court reasoned
that "a child could not be both legitimate, in that he was born during the marriage of
.his mother and her husband, and legitimated in that his mother and her second
husband, in their marriage, had attempted such legitimation." Id. The codal basis for
such a conclusion in Succession of Barlow and George was LA. CIV. CODE art. 178:
"Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated." Thus, under Article
178, if the child were both legitimate and legitimated as to two "fathers," he would
occupy a dual status as to the mother. Furthermore, the court noted, "If we were to
allow Ruffin George [alleged father] to maintain this action, what of the rights of the
legal father, Willie Jackson? Would both be able to maintain an action under La. C.C.
Art. 2315 for the death of 'their' son? We think the necessity of ruling for defendants
is obvious." Id. at 49.
More significant than the majority opinion in George, in light of the opinion in
Succession of Mitchell, supra, is the dissent from denial of a rehearing by then Judge
Tate. In disagreeing with the opinion on original hearing, Judge Tate relied, as he did
in Succession of Mitchell, upon the legislative history of LA. CiV. CODE art. 198:
"The majority's interpretation ignores this deliberate legislative amendment and
thwarts or greatly limits the legislative intention that children, such as the decedent
here, be legitimized in accordance with their actual parentage if their parents
subsequently become married to one another." Id. at 50. As possible solutions to the
problems that such a conclusion might cause, Judge Tate suggested (I) that the
presumption of Article 184 should be displaced by the subsequent marriage and
legitimation of the child under Article 198, which is the modern French solution; (2)
that there should be no objection to a child having "two fathers," citing putative
marriages as an example (although he did recognize that such a solution might pose
problems, Id. at 51 n. i); or (3) that "the presumption of legitimacy by birth during an
existing marriage does not extend to circumstances such as the present, where a child
does not enjoy the reputation of legitimacy because born during his mother's open
concubinage with other than the father." Id. at 52.
47. The court stated that an alternate ground requiring the result in Mitchell was
Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So. 2d 328 (1972). The
court preferred to rely on Article 198, however. In Babineaux the plaintiff brought an
action individually and as the representative of four minor children for the wrongful
death of her husband and their father. One of the children was born during the legal
marriage of his mother to Roland Arnold (but more than two years after a separation
in fact) and less than 180 days after a bigamous marriage ceremony between plaintiff
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legitimate child excluded on account of status from receiving the benefits of
legitimation? The court found that the legislative intent, as gauged by the
history of article 198, was to extend the benefits of legitimation to all
adulterous children, including those who were "technically" legitimate.
Article 198 defines the class to which it applies: "children born out of
marriage." All adulterous children are indeed born out of marriage and are
thus within the class to which the article applies. Mitchell, however,
presented a case where the children were presumed under Article 184 to be
the biological issue of their mother's first husband. The state's process of
filiation fixed paternity in such a way that the children were born within
marriage in the contemplation of the law.
The children, however, alleged that the presumption of Article 184
was false as applied to their case. An essential element of their case was
proof that their mother had committed adultery with the man whom they
claimed as the father. This was not an action to disavow paternity, which
can only be brought by the husband or his heirs. This was an action to fix
and the decedent. Both the trial and appellate courts' judgments sustained the
exception of no right of action in regard to the plaintiff's suit in her own behalf and in
her representative capacity for the one child. According to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, the status of the child could not be decided without further evidence, thus the
case was remanded to the trial court for "proceedings not inconsistent with the views
herein expressed." 262 So. 2d at 338. The child was born during the legal marriage of
his mother to her husband, thus the presumption of LA. CIv. CODE art. 184 applied;
and he was conceived before and born during the bigamous marriage between his
mother and the decedent. The court considered the following evidence necessary:
(i) had the child been disavowed by Arnold? (2) was the child subject to such a
disavowal action under Civil Code Article 191? (3) was the decedent in "good
faith"under Civil Code Articles 117-118, such that the "putative marriage" doctrine
could be invoked? Dependent upon the answers to the preceding questions, the court
opined: "This child may very well be the legitimate child of Arnold alone, the
legitimate child of Babineaux alone, or the legitimate child of Arnold and
Babineaux." 262 So. 2d at 338. Significantly, in a footnote within the previously
quoted sentence, the Court distinguishes the facts in Babineauxfrom those in George
v. Bertrand and Succession of Barlow: "Cf. Art. 178; Succession of Barlow, supra,
and George v. Bertrand, supra, where the courts were considering the child as
occupying both a legitimate and a legitimated status as opposed to a double legitimate
status." 262 So. 2d at 338 n.12.
48. "This intent, we have found, is to permit legitimation by the subsequent
marriage of their parents of alladulterous children, whether technically illegitimate or
technically legitimate at birth (whether or not subsequently disavowed by a long-
separated husband if he returns or discovers his wife has had a child during his
absence)." (Emphasis added). 323 So. 2d 451, 457 (La. 1975). Classification as
legitimate or illegitimate is governed by technical rules. The use of the qualifying
adjective "technical" in this context carries perhaps a pejorative connotation, but
serves no descriptive purpose.
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paternity, to establish filiation. However, the first step in Mitchell was
necessarily to show that the husband was not the father, which is also the
object of an action en desaveu. The question thus posed was what legal
evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of Article 184 in such a case.
The answer the court gave is noteworthy. In startling contrast to prior
jurisprudence,4 9 the court implicitly held (1) that a class of persons,
undefined but certainly including persons other than the husband or his
heirs, may rebut the presumption of Article 184, (2) without any apparent
time limits within which they must act, (3) by meeting an undefined
standard of proof which is in any event less rigorous than that required for
an action en desaveu.50
The greatest import of Mitchell is that it changes the rules by which
paternity is fixed. The presumption apparently still operates to fix paternity
upon a "legal" father, but there is now an alternative avenue by which
49. The leading case is Succession of Saloy, 44 La. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892); see
note 15, supra.
In State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951), the Louisiana Supreme
Court stressed the importance of restricting proof of paternity contrary to LA. Civ.
CODE art. 184. The mother of a two year old child filed an affidavit charging the
defendant alleged father with criminal neglect of family under LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950).
The child was born during the lawful marriage of the mother to Leonard Bolden (not
the defendant, alleged father), who had not disputed the paternity of the child.
However, the state, in its prosecution, offered evidence to establish the defendant's
paternity. The lower court, over the objection of defendant's counsel, permitted the
introduction of the evidence despite the argument that the conclusive presumption of
Civil Code Article 184 prohibited its admissibility. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered whether or not Act 164 of 1950 (amending LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950))
repealed by implication, at least in part, LA. CIv. CODE art. 184. Section 74, Title 14,
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 read in part as follows: "Criminal neglect
of family is the desertion or intentional non-support: . . .(2) By either parent of his
minor child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous
circumstances. Solely for the purpose of determining the obligation to support, the
court shall admit proof of paternity or maternity, or both." Recognizing that "repeals
by implication" are not favored, the court concluded that "by the phrase 'admit
proof of paternity,' the Legislature might well have intended only the introduction of
evidence in the case of a legitimate child to prove an iccused's marriage to the child's
mother and his failure to disavow legitimacy timely; and in the case of an illegitimate
child to establish that the child's mother was unmarried and that . the accused was
responsible for its birth." 53 So. 2d at 691. According to the court, the preceding was
the proper interpretation of the statutory provisions for two reasons: (1) "there is
nothing to indicate an intention to repeal the discussed codal articles with the
consequent destruction of the established conclusive presumption of legitimacy,"
and (2) such a construction of the provisions "best comports to reason and justice"
for "[a]n unqualified destruction of the established conclusive presumption . . .
might lead to injustice, oppression and absurd consequences." Id.
50. But cf. La. Acts 1976, No. 430, § I: quoted in note 64, infra.
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paternity may be fixed upon a second man, the "biological" father. The
extent of the change is unclear, because the court did not directly allude to it.
It is clear, however, that, until Mitchell, the only legal evidence by which
children could rebut the presumption of Article 184 was by producing a
judgment of disavowal obtained by their mother's husband. Now children
apparently have the right to show the true facts of paternity by any probative
evidence, at least where the biological father subsequently married their
mother. There is no persuasive reason for supposing that this change in the
process of filiation depends upon and is restricted to the terms of Article
198. A logical extension of Mitchell would open this alternative avenue of
filiation (1) to any interested party (2) in any situation in which the existence
of a father-child relationship is pertinent.
DuAL PATERNITY
In both Warren and Mitchell, children were presumed to be issue of
their mothers' husbands, the so-called "legal" fathers. In both, children
were permitted to prove that they were in fact issue of other men, the
so-called "biological" fathers. The question arises whether the legal father
remains bound in a father-child relationship with children even after the
children have proven that he could not possibly be their biological father.
In Warren, where the child occupied illegitimate status with respect to
her biological father, the court stated that the legal father's rights and
obligations subsisted parallel to those of the biological father.51 In Mitchell,
where the children assumed legitimate status with respect to their biological
father, the court believed that it was unnecessary to decide that issue.5 2 The
51. "The argument rightly assumes that there is no question that the child may
recover for the wrongful death of her legitimate father." 296 So. 2d 813, 815 (La.
1974).
52. 323 So. 2d at 457. But see Dugas v. Henson, 307 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975) (former husband sought to disavow the paternity of a child born 279 days after a
judgment of separation from bed and board). The former husband argued that "the
strong policy in favor of the presumption of legitimacy is eliminated herein, inasmuch
as the child can be deemed the legitimated child of Wayne Henson [biological father]
and Dianne Fournet [mother] by virtue of their marriage, C.C. Art. 198 .... "Id. at
654. The court concluded that a child who is presumed to be the legitimate child of the
mother's husband cannot also be the legitimated child of the biological father and
mother should they subsequently marry, citing George and Succession of Barlow.
Less than a year before the decision in Succession of Mitchell, the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Dugas, 310 So. 2d 851 (La. 1975). However,
Justice Barham was of the opinion that certiorari should be granted, one of the
reasons being that " ... it was conclusively proved that the child is the biological
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court recognized in both cases the problems raised by dual paternity .3
These are potentially troublesome in connection with wrongful death
actions, successions and support.
Where there exists both a legal and a biological father, both clearly
may recover for the wrongful death of the child, and the child clearly enjoys
a right to recover for the wrongful death of both fathers. A claimant under
article 2315 must prove actual damages, however, which are difficult to
show where there existed no personal or economic ties between claimant
and decedent.5 4 Thus, the courts have a measure of control over potential
abuse of wrongful death actions.
child of Henson who is now the husband of the mother of the child." Id. Thus, "[tihe
child is the legitimated child of Henson." Id.
53. In Warren, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "We are not unmindful of
the problems a logical extension of these holdings may create, such as a child in these
circumstances recovering from both fathers for support and maintenance, or con-
versely, requiring the child to support both fathers, in a proper case." LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 227, 229. 296 So. 2d at 817.
In speculating about what effect, if any, the legitimation by subsequent marriage
would have upon the children's presumed status as the legitimate children of the first
husband, the court in Succession of Mitchell posed the following question: "Or does
the legitimation simply create in a second person the legal relationship of father to the
now-legitimated child, without displacing any presumed similar legal relationship
arising from the first marriage?" 323 So. 2d 451, 457 (La. 1975). In a footnote, the
court analogized the result, should the answer be affirmative, to the situations of (1) a
child presumed to be the legitimate child of two fathers, due to overlapping presump-
tions of legitimacy (but cf. La. Acts 1976, No. 430, § I-Article 186 as reenacted, note
64, infra); (2) an adoptive child who may inherit from both his natural and his adoptive
father (LA. CIv. CODE art. 214); and (3) children of both a legal and a putative
marriage considered as one man's legitimate issue (see Cortes v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d
611 (La. 1974)). Id. at n.6.
54. Two recent Louisiana appellate court cases are illustrative-Cosey v. Allen,
316 So. 2d 513 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1975); Meaux v. Wiley, 325 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975).
In Cosey v. Allen, the presumed legitimate father (husband of the mother under
LA. CiV. CODE art. 184) sued for the wrongful death of three children, only one of
whom by his own admission was his biological child. Although the court recognized
that he had the right to recover his own damages as a result of the wrongful deaths of
his children, it held that the law did not compel "the conclusion that he was damaged
by their deaths . . . even nominally" and sustained the trial court's award of $500.
316 So. 2d at 517.
In Meaux v. Wiley, however, the appellate court reduced a trial court award of
$40,000 to the plaintiff for the wrongful death of his son to $20,000, as "the record is
devoid of testimony or evidence indicating the nature of the relationship between
Meaux [father] and his deceased son." 325 So. 2d at 657. As justification for the
award of $20,000 to Meaux, the court stated, "That amount is allowed on the basis of
the natural grief sustained by a father over the death of his son." (Emphasis added).
Id. The court considered Meaux's claim of damages for the wrongful death of another
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Dual paternity creates more difficult problems in successions law and
with respect to the obligations of support. Fathers and children enjoy rights
with respect thereto without regard to existing personal and economic ties.
In the Mitchell fact situation, the practical possibility exists that a child
could be entitled to inherit as a forced heir in the succession of two fathers
and that they may both inherit as forced heirs in the child's succession.55 In
the latter event, how is the forced portion to be allocated? 56 Because the
child can now claim support from both fathers 57 the question arises as to the
nature of the obligations owed by them. Are the fathers liable jointly, 58
severally,5 9 in solido, 6° or in solidum,61 or are they not bound together at all?
son-Joseph Bert Crain-possibly conceived and born during the marriage of his
mother and another man (her previous husband). In relying on Mitchell, although the
reasoning is not clear, the court held that "there was no bar to the legitimation of
Joseph by Bertrand and Martha's subsequent marriage," even if Joseph had been
conceived and born during the marriage of his mother and her first husband. Id. This
latter conclusion is, of course, based upon the assumption that the mother had
obtained a divorce from her first husband (see note 7, supra), and there was in fact no
evidence to the contrary.
55. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 902, 915, 1493-94.
Despite Justice Tate's statement in Succession of Mitchell, "[t]he present facts
indicate no substantial possibility that the courts will in fact ever be called upon to
decide any practical consequences of the issue concerning the children's continued
legitimacy insofar as the long-disappeared Charles Connor [presumed legal father]
• . ." (323 So. 2d 451,457 (La. 1975)), there is a possibility that the courts would have
to recognize the right of two fathers to inherit as forced heirs. For example, in Cosey
v. Allen, (see note 54, supra) it was the presumed legitimate father who reappeared
after an eight year absence and instituted the wrongful death action.
56. The authors can only speculate as to possible solutions for the dilemma. It is
possible that the forced portion accorded to the father could simply be divided
between the two claimants. On the other hand, the preferable solution might be to
increase by appropriate legislation the percentage "reserved" for the father in cases
where there are two.
57. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 227, 229. Presumably, it would first be necessary for the
child to establish a legal obligation of support, which is easily accomplished in cases
such as Succession of Mitchell by the legitimation under Civil Code Article 198 and
the presumption of Civil Code Article 184.
58. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2080, 2085-87.
59. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2078, 2084.
60. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2082, 2091-2107.
61. In solidum obligations, the Roman term, are also known to Louisiana
jurisprudence as imperfect solidarity. See Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497
(1880). For an excellent discussion of the differences between obligations in solido
and in solidum, see J. SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS ON CONVEN-
TIONAL OBLIGATIONS 350-51 (4th ed. 1973). A later case utilizing the concept of
imperfect solidarity was Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 291,291-98 (1975). See alsoComment,
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Important consequences, both procedural and substantive, depend upon the
answer to that question. The child, of course, owes a reciprocal obligation
of support to both fathers.62
The problems of dual paternity are not insoluble. However, the
solutions lie outside the confines of the Civil Code because the redactors
clearly did not contemplate dual paternity. The solutions will emerge only
from case-by-case adjudication. The authors have confidence in the ability
of the courts to fashion a just resolution of these problems. However, a civil
law system should not operate in this fashion, and it need not do so in this
instance. By restoring the distinction between filiation and classification,
the courts could avoid the problems of dual paternity.
A PROPOSAL
Warren and Mitchell were inspired by the desire (1) to treat justly
children who in the past have been punished for the misbehavior of their
parents and (2) to have legal paternity coincide with biological paternity.
For the reasons outlined in this article, they are not likely to accomplish
either. The problems presented have their roots in filiation, not in classifica-
tion. A failure to distinguish clearly between filiation and classification led
the court to create alternative processes of filation which have no basis in the
Civil Code or in jurisprudential tradition. Logically extended, the result is a
subversion of the presumption of Article 184 and the creation of novel
problems of dual paternity.
It is particularly urgent that the distinction between filiation and
classification be restored. It is likely that future decisions of the United
States Supreme Court will remove many of the remaining impediments
imposed upon illegitimate children, particularly in successions law. 63
Solidary Obligations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217, 220 (1951) and such foreign sources as 4
MARCADt, EXPLICATION Du CODE CIVIL no. 1201 (5th ed. 1852) and 2 M. PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. i, no. 777 at 417 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
62. LA. CiV. CODE art. 229.
63. A case which may affect the ruling of Labine v. Vincent (see note 38, supra) is
Trimble v. Gordon, 44 U.S.L.W. 3552 (June 29, 1976). In Trimble the United States
Supreme Court granted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and noted probable
jurisdiction. An Illinois circuit court judgment had the effect of denying heirship to an
illegitimate child in accordance with Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, "which, as
construed by the Illinois Supreme Court, permits illegitimate child to inherit from and
through mother but not from and through father unless child was legitimated prior to
father's death...." Id. This judgment was affirmed on appeal by the Illinois
Supreme Court in a bench announcement on September 24, 1975 (docket no. 47339).
In In re Estate of Karas, 61111. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975), as in Trimble, the issue
was whether the Illinois provision permitting an illegitimate to inherit from her
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Classification will in the future have less significance. It would still seem a
basic goal to fix paternity on the basis of a biological connection, to relate in
the father-child bond two persons who in fact possess that bond. Filiation
will in the future retain its significance.
The legislature has recently amended the articles governing the action
en desaveu.64 The husband has now a reasonable opportunity to show
mother but not her father (unless he had legitimated her) was unconstitutional, a
denial of due process and equal protection of the law. In upholding the constitutional-
ity of Section 12 of the Probate Code, the court cited Labine v. Vincent as controlling,
the effect of which according to the court had not been lessened by the Supreme
Court cases which followed (see text at notes 18-25, supra). According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the equal protection test to apply in examining the constitutionality
of Section 12 was formulated as follows: "Under traditional concepts of Federal
equal protection a legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational
relationship to a valid governmental purpose, and the burden of rebutting the
presumptive validity of the classification rests upon the party challenging its constitu-
tionality. . . .When the classification, however, affects fundamental rights. . . or
involves a 'suspect classification' . . . , the burden is placed upon the State to
demonstrate that the distinction is justified by a compelling governmental interest."
329 N.E.2d at 238. In commenting upon whether or not a classification based on
illegitimacy was a "suspect classification" the Illinois Supreme Court stated, "No
decision has been cited in which a classification based on illegitimacy has been
expressly held to be a suspect classification. Rather the decisions concerning
illegitimacy previously set forth would seem to have been determined on whether or
not the classification could be said to be predicated on a rational basis." Id. at 240. In
Labine v. Vincent, according to the Illinois court, "The Supreme Court noted that
Louisiana's intestate succession scheme was rationally based on its interest to
encourage family relationships and to establish a method of property disposi-
tion. . . .And we do not believe that Illinois has any lesser interest than Louisiana in
regulating the transfer of a decedent's property in its jurisdiction." Id. at 238.
According to the court, "We further recognize that the State maintains an interest in
prohibiting spurious claims against an estate. The parties to these appeals tend to
agree that proof of. . .paternal relationship may not be so readily ascertainable but
that such considerations should be decided individually on the facts of each case.
While establishing paternity in a proceeding to determine heirship is possible,
situations may arise which are fraught with fraudulent circumstances." Id. at 240.
64. La. Acts 1976, No. 430:
"Article 184. Presumed paternity of husband
The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born
or conceived during the marriage.
Article 185. Presumption of paternity, date of birth
A child born less than 300 days after the dissolution of the marriage is
presumed to have been conceived during the marriage. A child born three
hundred days or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not presumed to be
the child of the husband.
Article 186. Presumption of paternity, negation
The husband of the mother is not presumed to be the father of the child if
another man is presumed to be the father.
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non-paternity. However, these changes do not affect cases where the
husband fails to bring an action en desaveu, and, as Mitchell and Warren
demonstrate, it is often in the interest of other parties to show non-paternity.
The authors suggest a remedy intended to preserve the integrity of the
process of filiation. It is proposed that the legislature amend Civil Code
Articles 193-197 to clarify the means by which legitimate filiation may be
proven. The changes proposed have as their basis an interpretation of these
articles suggested elsewhere. 65 In view of the reluctance of the courts to
Article 187. Action in disavowal, burden
The husband can disavow paternity of a child if he proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence any facts which reasonably indicate that he is not the
father.
Official Revision Comment
Article 187 was amended to provide that evidence used in an action for disavowal
of paternity may consist of any facts which reasonably indicate that the husband is
not the father of the child. Examples of the type of facts which may create a
preponderance of evidence in an action to disavow may include (but are not limited
to) such items as blood grouping test results or any other reliable scientific test results
that preclude paternity of the husband, proof of sterility of the husband at the
probable time of conception, and remoteness of the husband from the wife that
makes the cohabitation unlikely at the probable time of conception.
Article 188. Husband's loss of right to disavow
A man who marries a pregnant woman and who knows that she is pregnant
at the time of the marriage cannot disavow the paternity of such child born of
such pregnancy. If another man is presumed to be the father, however, then the
provisions of Article 186 apply. The husband also cannot disavow paternity of a
child born as a result of artificial insemination of the mother to which he
consented.
Article 189. Time limit for disavowal by the husband
A suit for disavowal of paternity must be filed within one hundred eighty
days after the husband learned or should have learned of the birth of the child;
but if the husband for reasons beyond his control is not able to file suit timely,
then the time for filing suit shall be suspended during the period of such inability.
Article 190. Time limit for disavowal by heir or legatee
If the husband dies within the delay for filing suit to disavow paternity
without having instituted such action, an heir or legatee whose interest in the
succession will be reduced shall have one year from the death or one year from
the birth of the child, whichever period is longer, within which to bring such an
action."
Section Four of the same Act specifically provides that the article comments are
"not intended to be considered as part of the law and are not enacted into law by
virtue of their inclusion in this Act." In addition, Section Three of the Act, in adding
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5091. 1, provides for the appointment of an attorney
to represent the child in all disavowal actions.
65. Professor Robert A. Pascal contends that Civil Code Articles 184-192 must
be read in conjunction with Civil Code Articles 193-197, so as "to take into account
the totality of the law on legitimate filiation." PASCAL at 216. Thus, "[tihe conclusion
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accept this interpretation, however, a legislative amendment seems desir-
able. The amendment would set out this general distinction:
1. If a child is designated by registry as the child of the mother's
husband, then Article 184 establishes a presumption of paternity by the
husband which may be rebutted only by the husband or his heirs in
accordance with the articles governing the action en desaveu.
2. If a child is not designated by registry as the child of the mother's
husband, then Article 184 establishes a presumption of paternity by the
husband which may be rebutted by any interested party in an action
and by a preponderance of the evidence.
The proposal preserves the benefit of the presumption for children born
during their mother's marriage but makes its effect depend upon registry.
Registry, traditionally important in the civil law, 6 provides documentary
is inescapable: Articles 184-192 apply only to the child who has either valid registry or
reputation in his favor as the child of the mother's husband. Only then is the husband.
required to bring the action to disavow the child." (Emphasis added). Id. at 217. This
inescapable conclusion is reached by examining Articles 193-97. Under Civil Code
Article 193, one must produce the registry of his birth or baptism to prove legitimate
filiation. (See also LA. R.S. 40:159 (1950)). If the registry no longer exists or has been
lost, the party may prove his legitimate filiation by general reputation in accordance
with Civil Code Articles 194-95. If the party cannot prove his legitimate filiation by
either registry or reputation, then he may do so by any evidence of probative value.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 196. But, "in this latter instance at least, under Article 197, proof
against the claimed legitimate filiation may be made by showing (1) that the person is
not the child of the woman he pretends is his mother and, the maternity being proved,
(2) 'that he is not the child of the husband of the mother'." PASCAL at 217. The last
clause could not be limited to proof of a judgment of disavowal obtained by the
husband of the mother; otherwise, the entire suit to prove filiation to the husband
"would be useless." Id. Furthermore, registry of the child as that of another "should
not be considered to oblige the husband to disavow the child or accept its legitimate
paternity." Id. A child in such a case is not being held out to be legitimate, but by its
registry is illegitimate. The general presumption of Article 184, Professor Pascal
contends, should be limited to instances in which the mother asserts the legitimacy of
the child from the beginning. "With regard to reputation it could hardly be contended
that the married woman living in open concubinage, or living notoriously promiscu-
ously and separate from her husband, could create a reputation of legitimacy simply
by treating the child as if he were her husband's." Id. The author concludes with the
following comments: "And, above all, Articles 184-192 should be envisioned as
efforts to provide a legal determination of paternity when the facts are doubtful. They
must not be construed as if intentionally contrived vehicles of injustice." Id. at 218.
See also Judge Tate's dissent from a denial of rehearing in George v. Bertrand, 217
So. 2d 47, 52 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 253 La. 647, 219 So. 2d 177 (1969), and
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts forthe 1968-1969 Term-Persons, 30 LA.
L. REV. 171, 171-78 (1969).
66. SeeJ. BRISSAUD, AHISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW §§ 573-76(1912). "We
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evidence of paternity, on which third parties can rely. The proposal also
eliminates the problem of dual paternity.
It is suggested that the state has an interest in having legal paternity
coincide as nearly as possible with biological paternity. Yet more so, the
state has an interest in preserving the codal structure of our private law. Both
ends would be served by the proposed changes.
have not always had special methods of proof for birth, marriage, and death, that is to
say, for the principal facts relating to the civil status of persons. For a long while
recourse was had to ordinary means in order to establish them, such as testimony,
writings, a confession even, or an oath, presumptions. . . .Marriage and filiation
depended ordinarily on the possession of status. . . .The keeping of registers of
civil status relegated to the background these imperfect modes of proving; they were
only allowed when registers were lacking, that is to say, when the registers had
perished or had not been kept up. As a contrast to this, full faith was given to these
registers, which had the advantage of furnishing a preconstituted proof established
under the best conditions of impartiality and sincerity." Id. at 862-63.
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